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Mohamed Sweify* 
ABSTRACT 
Among the extensive literature associated with international 
commercial arbitration, disclosure has recently become ripe. 
Arbitrators should recognize the importance of the parties’ choice to 
resort to arbitration despite its costs. Practically, arbitrators are 
supposedly vigilant and proactive in disclosing any circumstances 
that may give rise to their potential bias. Nondisclosure blindfolds 
the parties to arbitrators’ true independence and impartiality. 
Operating on the premise that a dispute should be decided by a final 
and binding decision, non-disclosure may have implications in the 
post-award stage. Further, myriad or different disclosure standards 
may threaten the certainty and efficiency of the arbitration process. 
This Essay highlights the importance of having a clear established 
standard of disclosure. Given the interdependence between 
disclosure and impartiality, the Essay will surgically treat the subject 
through advocating the view of the Second Circuit on “evident 
partiality” by comparatively analyzing an actual dispute arbitrated 
in New York, challenged in New York, and sought to be enforced in 
Brazil. The Essay proceeds with Part II providing a background of 
the disclosure duty in international arbitration. Part III then 
analyzes the Abengoa case, the annulment proceedings in New York, 
and the enforcement proceedings in Brazil. Part IV advocates the 
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Second Circuit approach of evident partiality by comparing the 
Brazilian Supreme Court approach on disclosure. Part V concludes. 
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I. ARBITRATOR DISCLOSURE 
Unlike its public cousin, litigation, international arbitration is 
a relatively small community where arbitrators get to create a 
large pool of relationships which may raise concerns in different 
jurisdictions.1 However, arbitrators should uphold their 
impartiality.2 Arguably, arbitrators’ relationships should be 
 
1. INT’L BAR ASS’N, GUIDELINES ON CONFLICTS OF INTEREST IN INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 
para. 1 (Oct. 23, 2014), 
https://www.ibanet.org/Publications/publications_IBA_guides_and_free_materials.aspx 
[https://perma.cc/PV3V-8EKM] (“The growth of international business, including larger 
corporate groups and international law firms, has generated more disclosures and 
resulted in increased complexity in the analysis of disclosure and conflict of interest 
issues.”) [hereinafter CONFLICTS OF INTEREST]. 
2. INT’L CTR. FOR DISPUTE RESOLUTION, INTERNATIONAL DISPUTE RESOLUTION PROCEDURES 
art. 13(1) (2014) (providing that “arbitrators acting under these rules shall be impartial 
and independent,”) [hereinafter ICDR Arbitration Rules].  As per Canon I of the Code of 
Ethics for Arbitrators in Commercial Disputes, arbitrators should “consider their ability to 
be independent and neutral at the time of appointment”. AM. BAR ASS’N, ARBITRATORS 
ANNOTATIONS TO THE CODE OF ETHICS FOR ARBITRATORS IN COMMERCIAL DISPUTES Canon I 
(2014) [hereinafter CODE OF ETHICS]. 
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disclosed and, in some cases, may be a basis for recusal even if the 
applicable law does not clearly require that.3 
Generally, arbitrators should have a willingness to thoroughly 
and comprehensively investigate the circumstances that may give 
rise to disclosure.4 Most arbitral institutions have adopted a 
general standard of “justifiable doubts” of the arbitrators’ 
impartiality and independence. While some rules require an 
objective standard, others suffice with a subjective one.5 Others, in 
the scope of disclosure, distinguish between the reference to “facts 
and circumstances” and the reference to “circumstances” alone.6 
However, there is little guidance on the application of these 
standards.7 Ultimately, for arbitrators, disclosure is a relative 
concept that may be tested against the backdrop of numerous 
competing interests and goals such as speed, costs, and efficiency 
of the dispute resolution. 
 
3. See Laurence Shore, Disclosure and Impartiality: An Arbitrator’s Responsibility Vis-
A-Vis Legal Standards, 57 DISP. RESOL. J. 33, 34-35 (2002). 
4. See Roger Alford, Report to Law Revision Commission Regarding Recommendations 
for Changes to California Arbitration Law, 4 PEPP. DISP. RESOL. L.J. 1, 43 (2003). 
5. See UNITED NATIONS COMM’N ON INT’L TRADE LAW, UNCITRAL RULES ON TRANSPARENCY 
IN TREATY-BASED INVESTOR-STATE ARBITRATION art. 11, 
https://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/arbitration/arb-rules-2013/UNCITRAL-
Arbitration-Rules-2013-e.pdf [https://perma.cc/EWM6-EVDW] (last visited Oct. 24, 
2020) [hereinafter UNCITRAL RULES ON TRANSPARENCY]. Article 11 of the Arbitration Rules 
provides that “When a person is approached in connection with his or her possible 
appointment as an arbitrator, he or she shall disclose any circumstances likely to give rise 
to justifiable doubts as to his or her impartiality or independence.” Id. 
6. Article 11(3) of the ICC Rules of Arbitration provides: “[t]he prospective arbitrator 
shall disclose in writing to the Secretariat any facts or circumstances which might be of 
such a nature as to call into question the arbitrator’s independence in the eyes of the 
parties.” INT’L CHAMBER OF COMMERCE (ICC), ICC RULES OF ARBITRATION art. 11(3), 
https://iccwbo.org/dispute-resolution-services/arbitration/rules-of-arbitration/ 
[https://perma.cc/V47R-XE3P] (last visited Nov. 30, 2020) [hereinafter ICC RULES OF 
ARBITRATION]; Article 13(2) of the ICDR Arbitration Rules reads “ . . . The arbitrator shall 
disclose any circumstances that may give rise to justifiable doubts as to the arbitrator’s 
impartiality or independence and any other relevant facts the arbitrator wishes to bring 
to the attention of the parties.”  ICDR Arbitration Rules, supra note 2, art. 13(2); Article 11 
of the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules provides that “When a person is approached in 
connection with his or her possible appointment as an arbitrator, he or she shall disclose 
any circumstances likely to give rise to . . . [doubts about the arbitrator’s impartialty]” 
UNCITRAL RULES ON TRANSPARENCY, supra note 5, art. 11. 
7. Matthew David Disco, The Impression of Possible Bias: What a Neutral Arbitrator 
Must Disclose in California, 45 HASTINGS L.J. 113, 137 (1993) (advocating for a “reasonable 
person” standard to consider the relationship that may give rise to bias which should 
reflect the specialized skill of the quasi-judicial actor). 
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If inconsistent standards of disclosure are immutable 
markings of international arbitration, one would be left with 
dismay and unpredictability.8 The reality is more promising than 
that. Arbitration is often conducted in the international setting. 
National courts may work together in promoting efficient 
proceedings by adopting consistent approaches toward disclosure 
in order to meet the parties’ expectations. While prudence cautions 
against unbridled nondisclosure of relationships, it is a rare 
arbitration that operates without hindsight revealing some 
existing relationships that may not have been disclosed,9 an 
omission by arbitrators more out of habit than necessity. 
This habit is derived from the wide discretion of arbitrators in 
disclosing the circumstances that may raise some partiality 
concerns with the involved parties.10 The excessive disclosure 
discretion may create inconsistencies as to some cases where 
arbitrators may be hesitant to disclose. For instance, an arbitrator 
may have previously provided legal services to the opposing party. 
In addition, an arbitrator in a current case may have acted as a 
counsel in a previous case before another arbitrator who acts now 
as a counsel in the current case. These instances are clear examples 
of this hesitancy. Reasonable minds can differ on what constitutes 
substantial relationship, and accordingly, what relationship may 
warrant arbitrator’s partiality. Arbitrators’ sense of substantial 
relationships may likely differ from that of counsels’ to a certain 
extent. For counsels, disclosure has a substantial impact on the 
neutrality of the decision-making process, which should not entail 
any surprises in order to better serve their clients. An effective 
disclosure standard can, moreover, be had without compromising 
the expectations of each side. 
International arbitration is characterized by malleability that 
provides the process with effective vehicles, especially when 
differing legal cultures meet. Despite the flexibility of international 
 
8. Merrick T. Rossein & Jennifer Hope, Disclosure and Disqualification Standards for 
Neutral Arbitrators: How Far to Cast the Net and What Is Sufficient to Vacate Award, 81 ST. 
JOHN’S L. REV. 203, 251 (2007) (discussing the impact of the disclosure standards on the 
cost and efficiency of arbitration). 
9. Canon I (C) of the AAA/ABA Code of Ethics requires arbitrators to “avoid entering 
into any business, professional, or personal relationship, or acquiring any financial or 
personal interest, which is likely to affect impartiality or which might reasonably create 
the appearance of partiality.” CODE OF ETHICS, supra note 2, Canon I (C). 
10. ICDR Arbitration Rules, supra note 2, art. 13(2). 
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arbitration, some practices have become almost standards; albeit 
disclosure is not one of them. Arbitrator’s disclosure is not 
characterized by a single procedural format. Normally, arbitrator’s 
disclosure decision receives proper deference except in egregious 
situations where the non-disclosure may be a ground for annulling 
or refusing to enforce the award.11 In fact, an arbitrator’s decision 
to disclose information may inadvertently result in a subsequent 
challenge to the arbitral award. However, non-disclosure in some 
instances should be tolerable and should not stigmatize the 
arbitral award of any vociferous fallouts. A perplexing example is 
the arbitrator’s good faith or negligent failure to discover unknown 
conflict, or the lack of sufficient information to vindicate the 
viability of the conflict. 
The scope of disclosure and the apparent conflicts that this 
situation may create could be resolved by a circumspect perusal of 
the role of arbitrators and the ultimate goal of the arbitration 
process. In order to properly understand the perplexities of the 
disclosure requirement, there should be a rapport between 
disclosure and the impartiality and independence of arbitrators. As 
is widely recognized, disclosure should enhance the arbitrator’s 
impartiality. Nevertheless, broad disclosure may have fallouts, 
particularly in the arbitrators’ challenge proceedings and the 
enforcement of the arbitral award. Broad disclosure may open the 
door for trivial challenging grounds which may delay the 
proceedings. It could also create secondary questions that may 
assume unexpected concerns on the impartial role of arbitrators. 
Chief among these questions is whether the arbitrator’s impartial 
role assumes actual impartiality or a mere appearance of 
impartiality. The answer to that question should explain the 
disclosure standard that should be applied and its impact upon the 
proceeding.12 Disclosure, therefore, may be used as a tool of 
efficiency in the arbitration process and, in the meantime, may not 
truly reflect the actual partiality of an arbitrator in the decision-
making process. 
 
11. Catherine A. Rogers, Regulating International Arbitrators: A Functional Approach 
to Developing Standards of Conduct, 41 STAN. J. INT’L L. 53, 72-73 (2005). 
12. For instance, the IBA Guidelines on Conflicts of Interest categorize the 
information that should be disclosed and their impact upon the proceedings through red, 
orange and green lists which serve to eliminate the arbitrator’s discretion as to which 
information should/should not be disclosed. See CONFLICTS OF INTEREST, supra note 1. 
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A. The Second Circuit Approach 
The value of the arbitral awards lies generally in the limited 
grounds for their review. Unlike the New York Convention that 
does not refer to arbitrator’s impartiality or bias,13 the Federal 
Arbitration Act (“FAA”) provides for an evident partiality of an 
arbitrator as a basis for vacating an award,14 a standard that 
generated nebulous applications by different courts. 
The Supreme Court in Commonwealth Coatings adopted the 
“evident partiality” standard.15 Absent clear guidance on how to 
 
13. Article V of the New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of 
Foreign Arbitral Awards reads:  
1. Recognition and enforcement of the award may be refused, at the request of 
the party against whom it is invoked, only if that party furnishes to the 
competent authority where the recognition and enforcement is sought, proof 
that: (a) The parties to the agreement referred to in article II were, under the law 
applicable to them, under some incapacity, or the said agreement is not valid 
under the law to which the parties have subjected it or, failing any indication 
thereon, under the law of the country where the award was made; or (b) The 
party against whom the award is invoked was not given proper notice of the 
appointment of the arbitrator or of the arbitration proceedings or was otherwise 
unable to present his case; or (c) The award deals with a difference not 
contemplated by or not falling within the terms of the submission to arbitration, 
or it contains decisions on matters beyond the scope of the submission to 
arbitration, provided that, if the decisions on matters submitted to arbitration 
can be separated from those not so submitted, that part of the award which 
contains decisions on matters submitted to arbitration may be recognized and 
enforced; or (d) The composition of the arbitral authority or the arbitral 
procedure was not in accordance with the agreement of the parties, or, failing 
such agreement, was not in accordance with the law of the country where the 
arbitration took place; or (e) The award has not yet become binding on the 
parties, or has been set aside or suspended by a competent authority of the 
country in which, or under the law of which, that award was made. 2. 
Recognition and enforcement of an arbitral award may also be refused if the 
competent authority in the country where recognition and enforcement is 
sought finds that: (a) The subject matter of the difference is not capable of 
settlement by arbitration under the law of that country; or (b) The recognition 
or enforcement of the award would be contrary to the public policy of that 
country. 
UNITED NATIONS COMM’N ON INT’L TRADE LAW, NEW YORK CONVENTION ON THE RECOGNITION AND 
ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN ARBITRAL AWARDS art. V (1958).  
14. Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C.A. § 10(a)(2) (“In any of the following cases the 
United States court in and for the district wherein the award was made may make an order 
vacating the award upon the application of any party to the arbitration . . . where there was 
evident partiality or corruption in the arbitrators . . . .”). 
15. See Commonwealth Coatings Corp. v. Continental Cas. Co., 393 U.S. 145, 151 
(1968). Writing for the majority, Justice Black argued that “we should, if anything, be even 
more scrupulous to safeguard the impartiality of arbitrators than judges . . . .” Id. at 149. 
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apply this standard, the Second Circuit adopted its own 
interpretation of what is meant by evident partiality16 by 
criticizing both the appearance of bias and the actual bias 
standards17 and adopting a “reasonable person” standard to 
conclude that an arbitrator is evidently partial to one party.18 
Accordingly, the Second Circuit appears to adopt an objective 
standard of a “reasonable person,” considering all the 
 
Justice Black concluded that arbitrators must “disclose to the parties any dealings that 
might create an impression of possible bias . . . .” Id. Arbitrators must not only “be unbiased 
but also must avoid even the appearance of bias.” Id. at 150. Justice White in his concurring 
opinion pointed out that “the Court does not decide today that arbitrators are to be held to 
the standards of judicial decorum of Article III judges, or indeed of any judges.” Id. at 150 
(White, J., concurring). He has held arbitrators to a different standard than judges because 
arbitrators are “men of affairs, not apart from but of the marketplace[.]” Id. Justice White 
added that “arbitrators are not automatically disqualified by a business relationship with 
the parties before them if both parties are informed of the relationship in advance, or if 
they are unaware of the facts but the relationship is trivial.” Id. He referred to the regular 
activities of the arbitrators in the arbitration community where parties should not be 
encouraged to search for the insignificant undisclosed relationships as a pretext to avoid 
unfavorable decisions. Id. at 151. Justice Fortas refuted the presumption of appearance of 
partiality if the non-disclosure was not premeditated and was disclaimed by the 
complaining party. Id. at 152 (Fortas, J., dissenting). As a result of that decision, different 
standards have been developed by different Circuits to apply this test including i) 
“reasonable person standard,” Consol. Coal Co. v. Local 1643, United Mine Workers of Am., 
48 F.3d 125, 129 (4th Cir. 1995) (internal citations and quotations omitted) (“To 
demonstrate evident partiality under the FAA, the party seeking vacation has the burden 
of proving ‘that a reasonable person would have to conclude that an arbitrator was partial 
to the other party to the arbitration.’ . . . This reasonable person standard requires a 
showing of something more than the ‘appearance of bias,’ but not the 
‘insurmountable’ standard of ‘proof of actual bias.’”); ii) “reasonable impression of bias,” 
Woods v. Saturn Distribution Corp., 78 F.3d 424, 427 (9th Cir. 1996) (“A reasonable 
impression of bias sufficiently establishes evident partiality because the integrity of the 
process by which arbitrators are chosen is at issue in nondisclosure cases.”) and iii) 
“appearance of bias” Middlesex Mut. Ins. Co. v. Levine, 675 F.2d 1197, 1200 (11th Cir. 
1982) (“it is appropriate to vacate an arbitration award where the neutral arbitrator has 
the appearance of bias although there is no evidence of corruption, fraud, or partiality.”) 
This difference has extended to other jurisdictions such as Brazil which will be discussed 
later in this essay. See infra Parts III.2 & IV. 
16. Morelite Constr. Corp. v. N.Y.C. Dist. Council Carpenters Benefit Funds, 748 F.2d 
79, 83 (2d Cir. 1984); see also, Collin Koenig, If We Could, Then So Can You: The Seventh 
Circuit Resurrects Its Judge Versus Arbitrator Analogy to Reinstate A Repeat Arbitrator Note, 
2012 J. DISP. RESOL. 265, 269 (2012). 
17. The Second Circuit defined evident partiality by “requiring a showing of 
something more than the mere ‘appearance of bias’ to vacate an arbitration award,” yet 
not necessarily as impossible as “proof of actual bias.” Morelite, 748 F.3d at 83-84. 
18. Id. at 83 (citing Merit Ins. Co. v. Leatherby Ins. Co., 714 F.2d 673 (7th Cir. 
1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1009, 104 S. Ct. 529, 78 L. Ed. 2d 711 (1983)). 
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circumstances, to vacate an arbitral award.19 Moreover, a showing 
of more than a mere overlap between the prior relationship and 
the underlying dispute is required to disqualify the arbitrator who 
is alleged to be predisposed to one party.20 Certain factors also 
affect the Second Circuit’s determination of the evident partiality. 
Chief among these are 1) the extent of the arbitrator’s personal 
interest in the proceedings, 2) the relationship between the 
arbitrator and the party, and 3) the proximity in time between the 
relationship and the arbitration proceeding.21 Arbitrator’s overlap 
of service is therefore “not unusual . . . it is common for the same 
arbitrators to end up serving together frequently.”22 Moreover, 
although the failure to investigate may be an indication of evident 
partiality, it is not necessarily sufficient for vacating the arbitral 
award.23 
As such, under modern procedural formulae, disclosure 
standards are distinguishable from one jurisdiction to another and 
even between different courts in the same jurisdiction. This 
difference may add a measure of unpredictability for the 
annulment or the enforcement of the arbitral award. The Abengoa 
case is a clear manifestation of this unpredictability. 
B. Abengoa Case 
Claimant, ASA Bioenergy Holding, a company owned by 
Abengoa Group, and Respondent, Adriano Ometto, entered into a 
stock purchase agreement (“2007 SPA”), whereby the latter would 
sell the former the controlling interest of Grupo Dedini Agro 
(“GDA”) and, consequently, the ownership of sugar and ethanol 
plants located in São Paulo, Brazil.24 Soon after the sale, Abengoa 
 
19. Applied Indus. Materials Corp. v. Ovalar Makine Ticaret Ve Sanayi, A.S., 492 F.3d 
132 (2d Cir. 2007). 
20. Morelite, 748 F.2d at 83. 
21. See Scandinavian Reinsurance Co. Ltd. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 668 F.3d 
60, 74 (2d Cir. 2012) (citing Three S. Del., Inc. v. DataQuick Info. Sys. Inc., 492 F.3d 520, 530 
(4th Cir. 2007)). 
22. Id. at 74. 
23. See Applied Indus. Materials, 492 F.3d at 138 (“[t]he mere failure to investigate is 
not, by itself, sufficient to vacate an arbitration award. But, when an arbitrator knows of a 
potential conflict, a failure to either investigate or disclose an intention not to investigate 
is indicative of evident partiality.”). 
24.  See Brazil No. 49 of 2017, ASA Bioenergy Holding AG et al. v. Adriano Giannetti 
Dedini Ometto et al., Superior Tribunal de Justiça, SEC 9.412 – US, 43 Y.B Comm. Arb. 426, 
426 (ICC Int’l Ct. Arb.). 
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commenced two arbitrations before the International Chamber of 
Commerce (“ICC”) against Ometto in New York alleging that the 
seller had manipulated and omitted information during the 
negotiations and auditing of the company.25 The two ICC 
arbitrations were jointly heard before a three member tribunal.26 
Shortly after issuing the award, Ometto discovered that the 
tribunal’s Chair, Mr. David Rivkin, failed to disclose three elements 
that gave rise to doubts  as to the Chair’s impartiality, namely a) 
the Chair’s law firm had received significant legal fees from 
Abengoa during the course of arbitration; b) Debevoise & Plimpton 
LLP (“Debevoise”) had represented a company regarding its 
acquisition of an interest in an Abengoa affiliate and advised DOE 
as to whether to consent to such investment; and c) Debevoise had 
represented another company in its acquisition of an Abengoa 
subsidiary.27 The Chair admitted that he failed to conduct a proper 
conflicts check but denied any knowledge of his firm’s relationship 
with Abengoa at the time of the award.28 
1. Annulment Proceedings in New York 
Upon issuing the arbitral award, Ometto filed an annulment 
action before the US District Court for the Southern District of New 
York (“SDNY”) based on the conflict of interests that was readily 
discoverable during arbitration regardless of the Chair’s 
knowledge of its existence, because his admission of non-
disclosure demonstrated his partiality. 29 On January 7, 2013, SDNY 
denied the annulment petition.30 Evident partiality is sufficient to 
vacate an award “when a reasonable person, considering all of the 
circumstances, would have to conclude that an arbitrator was 
partial to one side.”31 The Court found that Rivkin was in fact 
completely unaware of the conflicts alleged by Ometto and his 
recklessness in conducting the conflict check at first was not 
 
25. These two arbitrations were conducted according to the ICC Rules: Case 
16.176/JRF/CA, Tribunal ordered Respondents to pay US$13 million, and Case 
16.513/JRF/CA, Respondents were ordered to pay US$ 114 million. Id. at 427-28. 
26. Id. at 427. 
27. Id. at 428. 
28. Id. 
29. See Ometto v. ASA Bioenergy Holding A.G., No. 12 CIV 1328 JSR, 2013 WL 174259, 
at *1-2 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 9, 2013), aff’d, 549 Fed.Appx 41 (2d Cir. 2014). 
30. Id. at 3-4. 
31. Id. at 3. 
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tantamount to “evident partiality.”32 The Court thus refused to 
impute constructive knowledge from the Debevoise partnerships 
to Rivkin.33 The Second Circuit, on January 7, 2014, upheld SDNY’s 
decision, concluding that Rivkin’s carelessness did not rise to the 
level of willful blindness because he had no reason to believe that 
a nontrivial conflict might exist, and thus had no further duty to 
investigate.34 
2. Confirmation Proceedings in Brazil 
Claimants sought recognition of both arbitral awards before 
the Brazilian Superior Court of Justice (“STJ”). According to the 
Brazilian Arbitration Act (“BAA”), the STJ may refuse confirmation 
of arbitral awards that violate the fundamental principles of 
Brazilian law.35 Ometto opposed the confirmation proceedings 
because, among other issues, the Chair failed to comply with his 
duty of disclosure for being a senior partner at a law firm that had 
represented Claimants in other cases and received great sums of 
money from them, and a proportional part of this money surely 
ended up in the account of the Chair after distributing the profits.36 
In contrast, Claimants contended that the Chair was unaware of the 
representation of his partners to any of the companies of Abengoa 
Group and that his law firm, in the said cases, had acted on behalf 
of adversaries of the group as well as the US Department of 
Energy.37 
By a majority of eight to one, the STJ denied the confirmation 
of the arbitral award due to the arbitrator’s failure to disclose 
circumstances that were reasonably capable of casting doubts over 
his impartiality and independence,38 noting that the arbitrator’s 
 
32. Id. 
33. Id. at 3-4. 
34. Ometto v. ASA Bioenergy Holding A.G., 549 Fed.Appx 41 (2d Cir. 2014) cert. 
denied, 573 U.S. 947 (2014). It is worth mentioning that the Supreme Court refused to hear 
the matter, even though the Ninth Circuit applies a different test of evident partiality to 
annul arbitral awards in similar situations. See Monster Energy Co. v. City Beverages, LLC, 
940 F.3d 1130, 1139 (9th Cir. 2019). 
35. Brazil No. 49 of 2017, ASA Bioenergy Holding AG et al. v Adriano Giannetti Dedini 
Ometto et al., Superior Tribunal de Justiça, SEC 9.412 – US, 43 Y.B Comm. Arb. 426, 429 
(ICC Int’l Ct. Arb.). 
36. Id. para. 4-5. 
37. Id. 
38. Id. 
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conduct violated the national public policy.39 The fact that a 
governmental body was the law firm’s client does not negate the 
creditor-debtor relationship between Abengoa and Chair’s law 
firm since the party had the obligation to pay Abengoa, not the US 
Department of Energy.40 Even if the Chair was unaware of this 
relationship, it is sufficient to put his independence objectively in 
doubt.41 
Unlike the majority, Justice Felix Fischer, the rapporteur, 
found no harm to the Brazilian public order and that the STJ lacked 
competence to rule over the partiality claim because this issue has 
already been decided by SDNY.42 Further, the Chair’s impartiality 
issue was questioned before the tribunal itself by a challenge 
request after the rendering of the arbitral award, but the request 
was not granted by the ICC Court of Arbitration because it lacked 
jurisdiction to amend or supplement the final award.43 Moreover, 
the Court found no material evidence refuting Rivkin’s sworn 
assertion that he was unaware of the alleged conflicts.44 
III. DEFENDING THE SECOND CIRCUIT APPROACH 
The issue before the New York and Brazilian courts was 
whether the attorney’s fees retained by a law firm, where the 
arbitrator is a partner, from a company of the same group of one of 
the parties before that arbitrator, amounts to a violation of this 
arbitrator’s impartiality. The following table compares both 
proceedings in New York and Brazil, including the outcome of each 











42. Id. at 430. 
43. Id. 
44. Id. 





Brazilian STJ’s Approach45 
 
 




Recognition of Award Annulment of Award 
Outcome Deny Recognition Dismiss Annulment 
Basis of 
Outcome 
Sufficiency of Nondisclosure to 
Impact Chair’s Impartiality 
Insufficient Evident Partiality 
Approach to 
Arbitration 
Pro-Enforcement Policy of Arbitral 
Awards 
Pro-Arbitration Policy with “severely 
limited” review of arbitral awards 
Standard of 
Disclosure 
Arbitrator’s failure to disclose any 
circumstances that are reasonably 
capable of casting a doubt over his 
impartiality and independence 
Arbitrator’s failure to disclose is 
sufficeint for a reasonable person, 
considering all the circumstances, 
to have to conclude that an arbitrator 
was partial to one side 
Application 
- A receipt of Chair’s law firm of 
considerable money by one of the 
parties during arbitration 
constitutes an objective ground of 
Chair’s partiality. 
- Chairman’s failure to disclose that 
circumstances objectively 
compromises his impartiality 
under Brazilian law and prevents 
the confirmation of the respective 
awards. 
District Court: 
- Chair’s recklessness in not 
disclosing is not tantamount to 
“evident partiality” nor sufficient 
evidence of “bias.” 
Second Circuit: 
- Chair had no reason to believe that 
a nontrivial conflict might exist, and 
thus had no further duty to 
investigate. 
- Rivkin’s carelessness does not rise 
to the level of willful blindness. 
 
Despite the STJ’s pro-arbitration policy, its ruling creates 
significant burdens on arbitrators. In the trade-off between 
impartiality and efficiency of the process, the STJ weighed the 
impartiality in its analysis regardless of the linkage between the 
non-disclosed information’s impact upon the arbitral award. The 
STJ, it seems, applied a subjective standard where a mere 
 
45. See generally Brazil No. 49 of 2017, ASA Bioenergy Holding AG et al. v. Adriano 
Giannetti Dedini Ometto et al., Superior Tribunal de Justiça, SEC 9.412 – US, 43 Y.B Comm. 
Arb. 426 (ICC Int’l Ct. Arb.). 
46. See generally Ometto v. ASA Bioenergy Holding A.G., 549 Fed.Appx 41 (2d Cir. 
2014). 
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appearance of bias was enough to refuse the recognition of the 
award, unlike the Second Circuit’s objective standard where an 
arbitrator must disclose the information that would cause a 
reasonable person to conclude that there was bias. 
A. Arbitration Process 
Arbitrators have the authority to decide the law and merits of 
the dispute unfettered from any appellate review mechanism. An 
apparent rather than evident partiality standard would threaten 
the arbitrators’ office with speculative challenges requests based 
on any undisclosed relationship. An evident partiality standard 
serves the objectives of arbitration.47 In the interests of expedition 
and efficiency, arbitration should be certain in terms of process 
and outcome. To justify vacating an award, partiality must be 
based upon direct and definite, rather than remote or uncertain 
demonstrations or mere speculations of bias. Otherwise, it may 
deteriorate the purpose for which arbitration was principally 
created by depriving arbitrators of their discretionary authority to 
decide the dispute absent real partiality. Some undisclosed 
relationships may be too trivial to warrant vacating an award. 
From an arbitrator’s perspective, there is a distinction 
between an arbitrator’s failure to disclose a relationship with one 
of the parties that could be construed as possible bias and an 
“actual bias” where an arbitrator is in fact biased. A mere 
representation of a law firm to corporate affiliates of a party is not, 
in fact, a real bias even if it may create an appearance of bias. An 
arbitrator’s actual bias affects the legitimacy of the outcome. In an 
apparent bias test, there would not be any distinction between 
substantial or unsubstantial undisclosed relationships. In an 
evident partiality test, there is room for making that distinction by 
vacating the award on only substantial undisclosed relationships. 
Evident partiality, hence, better serves the efficiency of the arbitral 
process because even if the circumstances may convey an 
appearance of partiality, this may not necessarily lead to a 
conclusion of partiality. 
From parties’ perspective, parties should have access to all 
information that may reasonably affect the arbitrator’s partiality to 
 
47. Evident means “clear to the understanding; manifest; obvious; conclusive.” 
Evident, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (6th ed. 1990). 
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evaluate the potential bias. The Brazilian approach upends the 
policy of arbitration. Rather than having an issue of whether a 
conflict is severe enough to indicate that partiality played a role in 
the arbitrator’s decision, the issue would be whether the parties 
have had access to the relevant information in aiding their decision 
to challenge the arbitrator based on partiality. Unlike the Second 
Circuit approach, the Brazilian approach would increase the 
judicial interference in arbitration, which goes against the 
arbitrator’s philosophy of lessening the judicial interference in the 
process.48 The shift will lead the courts to review the nuances of 
relationships between arbitrators and parties rather than 
reviewing the proceedings for evident bias. The Second Circuit 
approach would decrease the level of judicial interference in the 
arbitration proceedings, which promotes the autonomous and 
stand-alone arbitration regime. Courts’ review would be limited 
only to decide, by compelling evidence, the impact, not just the 
existence, of the prior relationships between arbitrators and the 
parties. 
B. Arbitrator’s Financial Interest 
Arbitration is a party-made process. Unlike judges, arbitrators 
normally have financial interests in the dispute: their fees. Due to 
the consensual and private nature of arbitration, every arbitrator 
has a financial interest in arbitrating subsequent matters for a 
party and cultivating repeat customers for their services. That does 
not lead to favoritism of one party over another because an 
arbitrator benefits if either party requests her services in the 
future. The evident partiality approach would promote that 
legitimate expectation of future financial interests which in turn 
would encourage arbitrators to perform a better job in attracting 
more appointments in the future. Given the arbitrators’ general 
and obvious economic interest in repeat businesses, potential 
partiality is an irredeemable consequence of the structure of 
private arbitration. This general economic interest should not be 
 
48. For instance, the Third Circuit expressed this view and presented some of the 
limited cases of the judicial interference such as “‘where the arbitrator clearly went beyond 
the scope of the submission’, or where ‘the authority to make award cannot be found or 
legitimately assumed from the terms of the arbitration agreement’, or if the arbitrator 
made a determination not required for the resolution of the dispute.”  Ludwig Honold Mfg. 
Co. v. Fletcher, 405 F.2d 1123, 1126 (3d Cir. 1969) (internal citations omitted). 
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the sole basis for an arbitrator’s partiality unless this partiality is 
supported by other evidence, not mere speculation that suggests 
the arbitrator’s bias.49 
C. Arbitrator’s Expertise 
Most capable arbitrators are often experts in specialized 
industries and may have had past dealings or relationships with 
any of the parties. Arbitrators are routinely appointed in specific 
disputes in multiple arbitrations, and it would be difficult to 
reconcile a presumption that concurrent appointments or past 
relations with one party must always be disclosed. The relatively 
small community of arbitration would inevitably create prior 
business relationships between the different players at stake. It 
follows that arbitrators should not be per se disqualified because 
of a business relationship with a party or a mere omission of 
disclosing that relationship. Accidental non-disclosure would not 
lead an objective observer to conclude that there is a real 
possibility of bias.50 In application, the apparent partiality may lead 
to ironic results in particular industry disputes. The issue should 
not be the existence of these relationships but the extent of their 
impact upon the arbitrator’s impartiality. A balance, therefore, 
should be struck between the competing goals of expertise and 
impartiality. The Second Circuit standard of evident partiality 
strikes that balance between these competing interests by 
requiring more evidence to prove partiality. This approach 
juxtaposes with the arbitration practice that is premised on repeat 
players.51 
 
49. Some arbitrators are displeased with the “tendency to overburden arbitration 
with excessive punctiliousness about impartiality.” Shore, supra note 3, at 10. (citing 
Arthur Marriott, Conflicts of Interest, 19 ASA BULL. 246, 248-49 (2001)). 
50. The English Court, in Halliburton v. Chubb, has adopted a similar approach to the 
Second Circuit approach where it shifted the bar for disclosure from “[giving] rise to 
apparent bias” to “[giving] rise to a real possibility of bias” in circumstances where a fair-
minded and informed observer “would” or “might” conclude that the situation would give 
rise to a real possibility of bias (an objective test). In applying this test, the Court found that 
the arbitrator’s failure to disclose the overlapping appointments was accidental and that 
he was highly respected and experienced and hence there was no apparent bias. See 
Halliburton Co. v. Chubb Bermuda Ins. Ltd. [2018] EWCA Civ 817 (appeal taken from Eng.). 
51. See infra Part IV.5. 
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D. Law Firms’ Structure 
Some economic considerations related to the internal 
structure of law firms may undermine the Brazilian approach.52 
First, there is no direct connection between having an ownership 
interest in a law firm and the arbitrator’s bias. Second, the 
involvement of a law firm with one of the parties in previous 
matters should not sua sponte create an impression of bias for an 
arbitrator who is a partner in that firm. Arbitrators’ revenues, even 
as repeat players, are a small fraction of the total revenues of the 
law firm. In addition, arbitrators, in many cases, may not have 
access to the overall profit of the firm to determine the exact 
contribution of that party to the firm’s profit. If an arbitrator owns 
an equity interest in a law firm that has previously provided 
services to one of the parties to arbitration, there should not be a 
per se impression of bias that supports vacatur of the award. 
Furthermore, the Brazilian approach would expand 
arbitrators’ disclosure requirements beyond existing rules to 
include any equity interest in law firms. It would shift the 
arbitrators’ selection calculus by pushing the parties to choose 
arbitrators who are not affiliated with any law firm regardless of 
their expertise in the particular industry underlying the dispute. 
Arbitrator selection is inevitably based on the knowledge and the 
expertise in a particular field, and excessive disclosure may 
undercut this benefit. In the meantime, knowledgeable and 
experienced arbitrators would have been extensively exposed in 
their areas of expertise, which makes their involvement in prior 
relationships that may raise concerns about conflicts of interest 
and hence their impartiality and independence, more likely. Both 
interests may appear to conflict. 
Arguably, excessive disclosure may support the legitimate 
concerns of arbitrators’ impartiality. However, it can also pose 
significant threats to the requisite level of arbitrator expertise. 
Arbitrators may be unable to serve as arbitrators because of their 
previously increasing involvement in the field. This approach 
would complicate the arbitrator selection and challenge process, 
 
52. See generally S. S. Samuelson, The Organizational Structure of Law Firms: Lessons 
from Management Theory, 51 OHIO STATE L.J. 645, 646 (1990) (analyzing the structure of 
law firms and suggesting new structures for rationalizing these firms to survive and 
flourish in the troubled industry). 
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undermine the efficiency and finality goals of arbitration, and 
incentivize dissatisfied disputants to engage in relentless efforts to 
disrupt both pending and final arbitrations. It leaves unclear 
answers to many questions, including the extent of ownership 
equity that an arbitrator should reveal in the law firm; the scope of 
disclosing the law firm’s overall profit and the period of time 
required to compare the overall profit to the arbitrator’s profit; the 
nature of the arbitrator’s prior services in a law firm and whether 
this may contradict the confidentiality of disclosure with other 
attorney-client relationships in the law firm; and what threshold of 
prior payments to the law firm or arbitrator require disclosure. 
E. Arbitrators’ Market 
Assuming, arguendo, that an arbitrator holds an ownership 
interest in a law firm, the application of the Brazilian approach will 
likewise relinquish the arbitrator’s work as a repeat player unless 
there is a disclosure of this ownership interest. Moreover, adopting 
this approach could prompt years of inexorable battles over the 
extent of disclosure required by arbitrators. The result will be 
elongated disputes that both parties have already spent 
tremendous amounts of time and money to resolve. To avoid the 
inevitable uncertainty that would exist in this situation, parties 
may prefer, as mentioned above,53 choosing solo arbitrators who 
are not affiliated with any law firm, and may be less likely to have 
expertise, but that are equally likely to retain a business of 
potential repeat players. 
Further, arbitrators have a real interest in providing high 
quality arbitration services for future appointment considerations. 
Arbitrators affiliated with firms also have an interest in 
maintaining the firm’s clients and making decisions favorable to 
parties who frequently engage in arbitrations. This is an inevitable 
result of the structure of the arbitration industry. Prior existing 
relationships are therefore inevitable consequences of practicing 
in the arbitration field. Relying upon the mere existence of 
undisclosed relationships, rather than their impact on the 
decision-making, would decrease the appointments of experienced 
and well-connected arbitrators. The chilling effect of this standard 
 
53. See supra Part III.D. 
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would harm the arbitration community and, as a result, the quality 
of the decision-making process and the process’ outcome. 
Accordingly, the Brazilian approach would create an 
imbalance in the market of arbitrators between experienced and 
new arbitrators. This approach would require the experienced 
arbitrators to spend more time investigating the prior activities 
not only in an arbitrator’s personal capacity but also for the firm’s 
activities to identify any circumstances that may give rise to any 
apparent bias. Unlike experienced arbitrators, new arbitrators 
would not exert any such effort due to their relatively new 
practices. The Second Circuit approach generally strikes the 
balance between the competing interests. First, arbitrators would 
be able to freely decide the dispute without the chilling effect of 
apparent potential bias for something they are not aware of, 
especially in a case that requires their expertise. Second, this 
approach should preserve global confidence in the impartiality of 
the arbitration process as well as the policy considerations 
regarding New York’s reputation as a center and preferred seat for 
international arbitration. The Second Circuit approach thus 
appears to lean toward a far more flexible and less prescriptive 
approach which opts for higher quality arbitration standards. 
The Second Circuit approach also promotes certainty and 
stability because it provides clear guidance on the disclosure 
requirement and the basis for failing that obligation, which would 
avoid significant costs on the parties and frivolous challenging or 
annulment proceedings.54 It also enhances the public confidence in 
arbitration and maintains its legitimacy by creating the perception 
that its decision-makers as impartial until it is proved otherwise. 
This approach also promotes the consistency in the community of 
international arbitration because the standard of apparent 
impartiality may be differently interpreted from one jurisdiction to 
another, whereas evident partiality would leave less room for 
these differences and should create mutual application of the same 
standard based on objective criteria. The flexibility of the Second 
Circuit approach would raise the bar of the partiality standard to 
best practices among practitioners. 
 
54. See Transit Casualty Co. v. Trenwick Reinsurance Co., 659 F. Supp 1346 (S.D.N.Y. 
1987), aff’d without opinion, 841 F.2d 1117 (2d Cir. 1988) (holding that the arbitrator’s 
lack of awareness of the fact that the company he owns stock held equity interest in one of 
the parties to arbitration is not basis for vacating the arbitral award). 
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V. CONCLUSION 
Arbitrator’s impartiality is central to the vitality of 
international commercial arbitration. However, courts have broad 
autonomy to fashion the applicable standard to this principle. 
Arbitrators should enjoy discretion to conduct the disclosure as 
the case requires, unfettered from the threats of partiality by the 
disputants. As argued above, the Second Circuit approach is more 
effective and practical than the Brazilian approach and promotes 
better policy and legal implications in the arbitration regime. A 
regime built around the present Second Circuit formula of evident 
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